Files
resolutionflow/backend/app/api/endpoints/account_security.py
Michael Chihlas c7cd711859 feat: AccountSecuritySettingsPage + active-users list + toast + login banner
Eighth commit in the session-expiration-policy series. Surfaces all
the owner controls and user-facing expiry UX that the prior commits
plumbed through, designed end-to-end via /plan-design-review (initial
4/10 -> final 9/10; 7 decisions locked in the plan).

Backend additions:
- accounts/me/security GET response gains active_users: list of
  {user_id, name, email, last_login_at} for users in this account
  with at least one un-revoked refresh token. Joined query on
  refresh_tokens + users, distinct, ordered by last_login desc.
  Drives the Active Sessions section.

Frontend additions:
- api/accountSecurity.ts: typed client for GET/PATCH/revoke-sessions.
- hooks/useAuthSessionExpiry.ts: reads idle/absolute expiry from the
  auth store, returns warning ('none'|'soon'|'now') + reason
  ('idle'|'absolute') so consumers can pick the right UX for the
  closer window. Re-evaluates every 30s.
- components/common/SessionExpiryToast.tsx: top-of-app notice that
  fires at T-5min. Idle case: warning-amber tone, [Stay signed in]
  button hits authApi.refresh() and updates the store on success.
  Absolute case: info-cyan tone, [Sign in now] link to /login (no
  recoverable action). Dismissable, doesn't re-fire after dismissal.
- components/account/RevokeSessionsModal.tsx: confirmation modal for
  the two bulk-revoke scopes. Title, body, and confirm-label vary by
  scope; danger-styled confirm button.
- pages/account/AccountSecuritySettingsPage.tsx: the main page.
  Header (Shield icon), intro, Policy card with Strict/Standard/Custom
  radios + always-visible-disabled Custom inputs (idle/absolute
  minutes) with inline validation, Save button + emerald success ping,
  info note about 'applies at next login'. Active sessions card with
  count-aware copy, list of {name, email, last-login-ago} rows
  (caller tagged '(you)'), two buttons — 'except me' hidden when
  count=1, 'sign me out and everyone else' uses danger-tinted styling.
- pages/AccountSettingsPage.tsx: 'Session security' row added to the
  owner-only settings list.
- router.tsx: /account/security route, owner-gated via ProtectedRoute.
- pages/LoginPage.tsx: cyan info-tone banner above form when
  ?reason=session_expired is in the URL.
- components/layout/AppLayout.tsx: mounts <SessionExpiryToast />.

Scope=all bulk-revoke UX (the most jarring moment): on success,
toast.success(N sessions), 1.5s delay, then clear localStorage +
useAuthStore.logout() + window.location='/login' (no banner — the
owner just did this).

Backend tests: existing 22/22 still green plus the GET test now
asserts active_users is present + non-empty after login. Frontend:
tsc clean, authStore test 2/2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-13 17:07:14 -04:00

215 lines
8.0 KiB
Python

"""Account session-policy endpoints — owner-only.
GET /accounts/me/security — read the policy + system bounds.
PATCH /accounts/me/security — set or clear the per-account override.
POST /accounts/me/security/revoke-sessions lands in the next commit.
See docs/plans/2026-05-13-session-expiration-policy.md §4.7 / §4.11.
"""
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Annotated
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status
from sqlalchemy import select, update as sa_update
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.api.deps import require_account_owner
from app.core.admin_database import get_admin_db
from app.core.audit import log_audit
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.security import resolve_session_policy
from app.models.account import Account
from app.models.refresh_token import RefreshToken
from app.models.user import User
from app.schemas.account_security import (
ActiveUser,
RevokeSessionsRequest,
RevokeSessionsResponse,
SessionPolicyResponse,
SessionPolicyUpdateRequest,
)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/accounts/me/security", tags=["account-security"])
def _policy_response(
account: Account, active_users: list[ActiveUser]
) -> SessionPolicyResponse:
eff_idle, eff_abs = resolve_session_policy(account)
return SessionPolicyResponse(
idle_minutes=account.session_idle_minutes,
absolute_minutes=account.session_absolute_minutes,
effective_idle_minutes=eff_idle,
effective_absolute_minutes=eff_abs,
idle_minutes_min=settings.SESSION_IDLE_MINUTES_MIN,
idle_minutes_max=settings.SESSION_IDLE_MINUTES_MAX,
absolute_minutes_min=settings.SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MINUTES_MIN,
absolute_minutes_max=settings.SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MINUTES_MAX,
active_users=active_users,
)
async def _load_account(db: AsyncSession, account_id) -> Account:
return (
await db.execute(select(Account).where(Account.id == account_id))
).scalar_one()
async def _load_active_users(db: AsyncSession, account_id) -> list[ActiveUser]:
"""Return distinct users in this account who currently hold an
un-revoked refresh token. See plan §4.7."""
from app.models.refresh_token import RefreshToken
stmt = (
select(User.id, User.name, User.email, User.last_login)
.join(RefreshToken, RefreshToken.user_id == User.id)
.where(User.account_id == account_id, RefreshToken.revoked_at.is_(None))
.distinct()
.order_by(User.last_login.desc().nulls_last())
)
rows = (await db.execute(stmt)).all()
return [
ActiveUser(user_id=row.id, name=row.name, email=row.email, last_login_at=row.last_login)
for row in rows
]
@router.get("", response_model=SessionPolicyResponse)
async def get_session_policy(
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(require_account_owner)],
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_admin_db)],
):
account = await _load_account(db, current_user.account_id)
active_users = await _load_active_users(db, current_user.account_id)
return _policy_response(account, active_users)
@router.patch("", response_model=SessionPolicyResponse)
async def update_session_policy(
body: SessionPolicyUpdateRequest,
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(require_account_owner)],
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_admin_db)],
):
account = await _load_account(db, current_user.account_id)
# Snapshot effective values BEFORE change, for audit.
old_idle = account.session_idle_minutes
old_abs = account.session_absolute_minutes
effective_old_idle, effective_old_abs = resolve_session_policy(account)
new_idle = body.idle_minutes
new_abs = body.absolute_minutes
# Per-field bound checks. NULL clears the override and is always valid.
if new_idle is not None and not (
settings.SESSION_IDLE_MINUTES_MIN <= new_idle <= settings.SESSION_IDLE_MINUTES_MAX
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
detail=(
f"idle_minutes must be between {settings.SESSION_IDLE_MINUTES_MIN} "
f"and {settings.SESSION_IDLE_MINUTES_MAX}"
),
)
if new_abs is not None and not (
settings.SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MINUTES_MIN <= new_abs <= settings.SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MINUTES_MAX
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
detail=(
f"absolute_minutes must be between {settings.SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MINUTES_MIN} "
f"and {settings.SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MINUTES_MAX}"
),
)
# Effective-value invariant: idle must not exceed absolute after defaults.
# The DB CHECK only catches the both-set case; this catches the partial-
# override case where (e.g.) idle=43200 with absolute=NULL would yield an
# effective idle larger than the system default absolute.
effective_new_idle = new_idle if new_idle is not None else settings.SESSION_IDLE_MINUTES_DEFAULT
effective_new_abs = new_abs if new_abs is not None else settings.SESSION_ABSOLUTE_MINUTES_DEFAULT
if effective_new_idle > effective_new_abs:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
detail=(
f"Effective idle ({effective_new_idle}min) cannot exceed effective "
f"absolute ({effective_new_abs}min)"
),
)
account.session_idle_minutes = new_idle
account.session_absolute_minutes = new_abs
await log_audit(
db,
user_id=current_user.id,
account_id=account.id,
action="account.session_policy_update",
resource_type="account",
resource_id=account.id,
details={
"old": {"idle_minutes": old_idle, "absolute_minutes": old_abs},
"new": {"idle_minutes": new_idle, "absolute_minutes": new_abs},
"effective_old": {
"idle_minutes": effective_old_idle,
"absolute_minutes": effective_old_abs,
},
"effective_new": {
"idle_minutes": effective_new_idle,
"absolute_minutes": effective_new_abs,
},
},
)
await db.commit()
await db.refresh(account)
active_users = await _load_active_users(db, account.id)
return _policy_response(account, active_users)
@router.post("/revoke-sessions", response_model=RevokeSessionsResponse)
async def revoke_sessions(
body: RevokeSessionsRequest,
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(require_account_owner)],
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_admin_db)],
):
"""Bulk-revoke refresh tokens for users in the caller's account.
`scope="all"` revokes every active session in the account, including
the caller's own. `scope="others"` preserves the caller's sessions.
The caller's access token is NOT revoked (we don't track access JTIs);
it dies on its 5-minute timer. For `scope="all"`, the frontend is
expected to log the caller out locally after the response.
See docs/plans/2026-05-13-session-expiration-policy.md §4.11.
"""
# Subquery: refresh-token rows belonging to users in this account.
user_ids_subq = select(User.id).where(User.account_id == current_user.account_id)
stmt = (
sa_update(RefreshToken)
.where(
RefreshToken.user_id.in_(user_ids_subq),
RefreshToken.revoked_at.is_(None),
)
.values(revoked_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc))
.returning(RefreshToken.id)
)
if body.scope == "others":
stmt = stmt.where(RefreshToken.user_id != current_user.id)
result = await db.execute(stmt)
revoked_count = len(result.all())
await log_audit(
db,
user_id=current_user.id,
account_id=current_user.account_id,
action="account.sessions_revoked_bulk",
resource_type="account",
resource_id=current_user.account_id,
details={"scope": body.scope, "revoked_count": revoked_count},
)
await db.commit()
return RevokeSessionsResponse(revoked_count=revoked_count)