Files
resolutionflow/backend/app/api/deps.py
chihlasm b3dba57bc5 feat: tenant isolation Phase 0 — app-layer filters, UUID audit, CI gate (#132)
* docs: add tenant data isolation design spec

Complete architecture plan for multi-tenant data isolation across
all layers (PostgreSQL RLS, application-layer filtering, schema
migration, testing strategy, and phased rollout checklist).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add background job isolation policy to tenant isolation spec

Documents policy for all 5 existing background jobs:
- Knowledge Flywheel and PSA Retry flagged for account_id threading
- Chat Retention already follows correct pattern (model for others)
- Maintenance Schedule Firing needs account_id in queries + Session creation
- AI Conversation Expiry approved as cross-tenant with justification

Adds approved cross-tenant query registry and Phase 2 checklist items.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add tenant isolation Phase 0 implementation plan

8 tasks covering: CRITICAL copilot hotfix, tenant_filter() helper,
get_tenant_context dependency, analytics/category/AI session gap fixes,
full UUID endpoint audit, TargetList dead code audit, teams orphan
check, and CI grep check for missing tenant filters.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add tenant_filter() helper and get_tenant_context dependency

tenant_filter(model, account_id) is the canonical app-layer tenant
scoping expression. Every query on a tenant table must use it.
build_tree_access_filter and build_step_visibility_filter updated
to call tenant_filter() internally for the account_id match.

get_tenant_context is a FastAPI dependency that returns account_id
or raises 403 if the user has no account — prevents raw access to
current_user.account_id and centralises the null check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scope analytics/flows/{tree_id} to requesting account

Any authenticated user could read flow analytics (session counts,
completion rates, CSAT) for any tree UUID. Now returns 404 if the
tree doesn't belong to the requesting account.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scope category tree_count to requesting account

tree_count on GET /categories/{id} was including trees from all
accounts, leaking cross-tenant row counts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restrict AI session search to current user only

Search endpoint used OR(user_id, account_id), exposing other users'
problem_summary and problem_domain within the same account. Sessions
are user-scoped only — cross-user access requires explicit escalation
or sharing. List and search endpoints now behave consistently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add ownership check and 404 responses to ai-sessions endpoints

Cross-tenant isolation audit found:
- retry-psa-push had NO ownership check (CRITICAL) — any user could retry any session's PSA push
- save_task_lane used db.get() without ownership filter, returned 403 revealing existence
- get_session returned 403 instead of 404 for unauthorized access
- stream_documentation returned 403 instead of 404

All now use query-level user_id filtering and return 404 to avoid revealing existence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 instead of 403 for cross-tenant session access

All session endpoints (get, update, complete, scratchpad, variables, export,
ticket-link) now return 404 instead of 403 when a user tries to access
another user's session. This prevents confirming existence of resources
across tenant boundaries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 instead of 403 for cross-tenant tree access

get_tree and update_tree now return 404 when a user cannot access a tree
(private tree from another account). Prevents confirming resource existence
across tenant boundaries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 instead of 403 for cross-tenant step access

get_step_or_404 now returns 404 when can_view_step or can_edit_step fails,
preventing confirmation of step existence across tenant boundaries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 instead of 403 for cross-tenant upload access

get_upload_url and delete_upload now return 404 when the upload belongs to
a different account/user, preventing resource existence confirmation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 instead of 403 for cross-tenant share access

revoke_share and create_share now return 404 when the caller is not the
owner, preventing resource existence confirmation across users.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 instead of 403 for cross-team tree access in maintenance schedules

_get_tree_or_403 now returns 404 when the user's team does not match,
preventing confirmation of tree existence across teams.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 instead of 403 for cross-account tag access

get_tag now returns 404 for account-specific tags that belong to another
account, preventing resource existence confirmation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 instead of 403 for cross-account step category access

get_step_category now returns 404 for account-specific categories that
belong to another account, preventing resource existence confirmation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add cross-tenant isolation tests for Task 6 UUID audit

Tests cover:
- Tree GET/PUT returns 404 for cross-account access
- Session GET returns 404 for cross-user access
- AI session GET returns 404 for cross-user access
- AI session retry-psa-push requires ownership
- Upload URL returns 404 for cross-account access
- Share revoke returns 404 for cross-user access

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: return 404 (not 403) for get_documentation cross-user access; add missing Task 6 tests

get_documentation was revealing session existence via 403. Added pre-check
query filtering by session_id AND user_id before calling the engine.

Also add cross-tenant isolation tests for steps, tags, step_categories,
and maintenance_schedules endpoints fixed in Task 6 (TDD was skipped).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address Task 6 quality review — rename helper, restore 403 for intra-account, add docs test

- Rename _get_tree_or_403 → _get_tree_or_404 in maintenance_schedules.py
  (function now raises 404, old name was misleading)
- Restore HTTP 403 for intra-account permission failures in update_tree:
  same-account users who can see a tree but can't edit it got 404 (wrong);
  only cross-account lookups should return 404 to avoid confirming existence
- Apply same 403/404 distinction to update_tree_visibility
- Add test: get_documentation must return 404 for cross-user session access
- Add comment documenting owner-only design for documentation endpoints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: Task 7+8 — TargetList audit, CI tenant-filter grep check

Task 7: TargetList dead code audit
- Found active code references in 12+ files across backend and frontend
  (full CRUD API + frontend page + MaintenanceScheduleSection + BatchLaunchModal)
- Decision: migrate to account_id in Phase 1 (cannot drop)
- DB row count not available from code-server — must verify from VPS SSH
  before Phase 1 migration
- Teams orphan check query documented; must run from VPS SSH before Phase 1
- Results documented in spec Section 9

Task 8: CI tenant-filter enforcement check (warn mode)
- Create backend/scripts/check_tenant_filters.py
  Scans endpoint and service files for select() on tenant tables without
  tenant_filter/account_id/user_id in surrounding context. Currently
  reports 109 warnings (Phase 1 backlog). Exits 0 (warn mode).
- Add Check tenant filter enforcement step to backend CI job
  Add --fail flag after Phase 1 backlog clears to make it blocking.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: record Phase 0 audit results — 0 orphaned teams, 0 target_list rows

Both checks confirmed 2026-04-09 from production DB.
Phase 1 migration is safe to proceed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 00:42:19 -04:00

210 lines
6.8 KiB
Python

from typing import Annotated, Optional
from uuid import UUID
from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordBearer
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from sqlalchemy import select
import sentry_sdk
from app.core.database import get_db
from app.core.security import decode_token
from app.models.user import User
from app.models.plan_limits import PlanLimits
# Routes that are allowed even when must_change_password is True
_PASSWORD_CHANGE_ALLOWLIST = {
"/api/v1/auth/password/change",
"/api/v1/auth/logout",
"/api/v1/auth/me",
}
oauth2_scheme = OAuth2PasswordBearer(tokenUrl="/api/v1/auth/login")
async def get_current_user(
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
token: Annotated[str, Depends(oauth2_scheme)]
) -> User:
"""Get current authenticated user from JWT token."""
credentials_exception = HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Could not validate credentials",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
)
payload = decode_token(token)
if payload is None:
raise credentials_exception
token_type = payload.get("type")
if token_type != "access":
raise credentials_exception
user_id: str = payload.get("sub")
if user_id is None:
raise credentials_exception
try:
user_uuid = UUID(user_id)
except ValueError:
raise credentials_exception
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_uuid))
user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if user is None:
raise credentials_exception
return user
async def get_refresh_token_payload(
token: Annotated[str, Depends(oauth2_scheme)]
) -> dict:
"""Extract and validate a refresh token from the Authorization header."""
payload = decode_token(token)
if payload is None or payload.get("type") != "refresh":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Invalid refresh token",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
)
return payload
async def get_current_active_user(
request: Request,
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)],
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
) -> User:
"""Ensure user is active (not disabled). Auto-downgrades expired trials.
Enforces must_change_password — blocks all routes except allowlist."""
if not current_user.is_active:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="Account has been deactivated"
)
# Enforce must_change_password (backend hard lock)
if current_user.must_change_password:
if request.url.path not in _PASSWORD_CHANGE_ALLOWLIST:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="password_change_required"
)
# Set Sentry user context for error attribution
sentry_sdk.set_user({"id": str(current_user.id), "email": current_user.email})
# Lightweight trial expiry check
if current_user.account_id:
from app.models.subscription import Subscription
from datetime import datetime, timezone
result = await db.execute(
select(Subscription).where(Subscription.account_id == current_user.account_id)
)
subscription = result.scalar_one_or_none()
if (
subscription
and subscription.status == "trialing"
and subscription.current_period_end
and subscription.current_period_end < datetime.now(timezone.utc)
):
subscription.plan = "free"
subscription.status = "active"
subscription.current_period_end = None
subscription.current_period_start = None
await db.commit()
return current_user
async def require_admin(
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user)]
) -> User:
"""Require super admin access."""
if not current_user.is_super_admin:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="Super admin access required"
)
return current_user
async def require_engineer_or_admin(
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user)]
) -> User:
"""Require engineer, account owner, or super admin role (blocks viewers)."""
if current_user.is_super_admin:
return current_user
if current_user.account_role in ("owner", "admin", "engineer"):
return current_user
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="Engineer or admin access required"
)
async def require_team_admin(
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user)]
) -> User:
"""Require team admin, account owner, or super admin role."""
if current_user.is_super_admin:
return current_user
if current_user.is_team_admin:
return current_user
if current_user.account_role == "owner":
return current_user
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="Team admin access required"
)
async def require_account_owner(
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user)]
) -> User:
"""Require account owner or super admin access."""
if current_user.is_super_admin:
return current_user
if current_user.account_role == "owner":
return current_user
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="Account owner access required"
)
def get_service_account_id(request: Request) -> Optional[UUID]:
"""Return the cached ResolutionFlow service account UUID from app.state.
Returns None in test environments where lifespan startup did not run.
"""
return getattr(request.app.state, "service_account_id", None)
async def get_plan_limits_for_user(
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user)],
db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
) -> Optional[PlanLimits]:
"""Get plan limits for the current user's account."""
from app.core.subscriptions import get_user_plan_limits
return await get_user_plan_limits(current_user.account_id, db)
async def get_tenant_context(
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_active_user)],
) -> UUID:
"""Return the current user's account_id.
Use this dependency instead of reading current_user.account_id directly.
Raises 403 if the user has no account association (should not happen in
normal flows — users are always associated with an account on registration).
"""
if current_user.account_id is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="User not associated with any account",
)
return current_user.account_id