create_ticket, update_status (sets resolved_at on resolve), get_ticket,
list_tickets_for_account (status filter, account-scoped), promote_to_psa.
Used by L1 intake when account has no PSA integration configured.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner-only endpoint to toggle can_cover_l1 on an engineer user. 422 if target
role is not engineer (owners/super_admins already see L1 surface; viewers/
l1_techs don't need this flag). 404 for cross-account targets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Returns {engineer: SeatCheckResult, l1_tech: SeatCheckResult} for the
authenticated engineer's account. Powers the SeatCounterWidget UI in the
admin/users + account/users surfaces. Engineer+ access only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- oauth.py: use status.HTTP_402_PAYMENT_REQUIRED constant (was raw 402)
- accounts.py bulk-invite: catch HTTPException separately to preserve
structured detail dict in failed-row error (was stringified repr,
unparseable by clients)
- Add bulk-invite per-row 402 test verifying structured error preserved
T8 code review identified these as Important issues. Functional change is
the bulk-invite fix; clients can now parse seat-limit errors from bulk
responses. 13/13 seat-enforcement tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
For engineer + l1_tech roles, check_seat_available is called at each
mutation point. Returns 402 Payment Required with structured detail
{code: 'seat_limit_exceeded', role, current, limit, upgrade_url} when
seats are full. Grandfathering: existing over-seated accounts keep
existing users; only new mutations are blocked.
Also updates AccountInviteCreate and AccountRoleUpdate schemas to
accept l1_tech as a valid role value.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shared helper used by invite, accept-invite, and role-change endpoints
(integrated in T8). Counts active users by role against role-specific
seat limit on subscription (engineer → seat_limit, l1_tech → l1_seat_limit).
None limit = unlimited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eighth commit in the session-expiration-policy series. Surfaces all
the owner controls and user-facing expiry UX that the prior commits
plumbed through, designed end-to-end via /plan-design-review (initial
4/10 -> final 9/10; 7 decisions locked in the plan).
Backend additions:
- accounts/me/security GET response gains active_users: list of
{user_id, name, email, last_login_at} for users in this account
with at least one un-revoked refresh token. Joined query on
refresh_tokens + users, distinct, ordered by last_login desc.
Drives the Active Sessions section.
Frontend additions:
- api/accountSecurity.ts: typed client for GET/PATCH/revoke-sessions.
- hooks/useAuthSessionExpiry.ts: reads idle/absolute expiry from the
auth store, returns warning ('none'|'soon'|'now') + reason
('idle'|'absolute') so consumers can pick the right UX for the
closer window. Re-evaluates every 30s.
- components/common/SessionExpiryToast.tsx: top-of-app notice that
fires at T-5min. Idle case: warning-amber tone, [Stay signed in]
button hits authApi.refresh() and updates the store on success.
Absolute case: info-cyan tone, [Sign in now] link to /login (no
recoverable action). Dismissable, doesn't re-fire after dismissal.
- components/account/RevokeSessionsModal.tsx: confirmation modal for
the two bulk-revoke scopes. Title, body, and confirm-label vary by
scope; danger-styled confirm button.
- pages/account/AccountSecuritySettingsPage.tsx: the main page.
Header (Shield icon), intro, Policy card with Strict/Standard/Custom
radios + always-visible-disabled Custom inputs (idle/absolute
minutes) with inline validation, Save button + emerald success ping,
info note about 'applies at next login'. Active sessions card with
count-aware copy, list of {name, email, last-login-ago} rows
(caller tagged '(you)'), two buttons — 'except me' hidden when
count=1, 'sign me out and everyone else' uses danger-tinted styling.
- pages/AccountSettingsPage.tsx: 'Session security' row added to the
owner-only settings list.
- router.tsx: /account/security route, owner-gated via ProtectedRoute.
- pages/LoginPage.tsx: cyan info-tone banner above form when
?reason=session_expired is in the URL.
- components/layout/AppLayout.tsx: mounts <SessionExpiryToast />.
Scope=all bulk-revoke UX (the most jarring moment): on success,
toast.success(N sessions), 1.5s delay, then clear localStorage +
useAuthStore.logout() + window.location='/login' (no banner — the
owner just did this).
Backend tests: existing 22/22 still green plus the GET test now
asserts active_users is present + non-empty after login. Frontend:
tsc clean, authStore test 2/2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sixth commit in the session-expiration-policy series. The kill-all-
sessions endpoint folded into scope after the §4.11 design pass.
- POST /accounts/me/security/revoke-sessions, owner-only.
- Body: {"scope": "all" | "others"}. Default "all" includes the caller's
own refresh token. "others" preserves the caller's sessions so an
owner can sign everyone else out without logging themselves out.
- Single SQL UPDATE through users.account_id -> refresh_tokens, with
revoked_at IS NULL preserved as the gate so already-revoked rows
don't get double-stamped (the idempotency property).
- Caller's access token is not touched — it dies on its 5-minute timer.
Frontend handles "scope=all" UX by clearing localStorage and
redirecting after the response (commit 8).
- Affected users' next /auth/refresh hits the existing atomic-revoke
zero-rows path -> invalid_refresh_token (plain logout, no banner).
- Writes one account.sessions_revoked_bulk audit event with
{scope, revoked_count}.
Tests added in test_session_policy.py (6 cases):
- #17 scope=all kills caller's own session; their refresh -> 401
invalid_refresh_token.
- #18 scope=others preserves caller's session; their refresh succeeds,
member's refresh -> 401 invalid_refresh_token.
- #19 account-scoped: test_admin in a different account is unaffected
when test_user's owner runs revoke-all (revoked_count=1, not 2).
- #20 engineer-role member -> 403.
- #21 emits exactly one audit row with the expected payload.
- #22 idempotent: second immediate POST returns revoked_count=0.
22/22 in test_session_policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fifth commit in the session-expiration-policy series. Surfaces the
session-policy override controls to account owners.
- schemas/account_security.py: NEW. SessionPolicyResponse returns both
the override (Optional[int]) and the effective value (always present)
plus the system min/max bounds, so the frontend can render the
Custom-preset form without re-implementing the defaults logic.
SessionPolicyUpdateRequest accepts NULL to clear an override.
- endpoints/account_security.py: NEW. GET and PATCH on /me/security.
Owner-only via require_account_owner. PATCH validates per-field
bounds, then validates the effective idle <= absolute invariant
(catching the partial-override case the DB CHECK can't see), then
writes the row + an account.session_policy_update audit event with
old/new/effective_old/effective_new payload.
- router.py: registers the new router under _tenant_deps next to
accounts.router.
Tests added in test_session_policy.py (8 cases):
- GET returns NULL overrides + Strict defaults + system bounds.
- PATCH persists override; next login JWT reflects new values
(60min/240min -> idle_max=3600, abs_max=14400 seconds).
- PATCH rejects idle < min (422).
- PATCH rejects absolute > max (422).
- PATCH rejects idle > absolute when both are set (422).
- PATCH rejects partial override that produces effective idle >
effective absolute (idle=43200, absolute=NULL with default 20160).
- Engineer-role user gets 403.
- PATCH writes exactly one audit row with the expected payload shape.
16/16 in test_session_policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fourth commit in the session-expiration-policy series. The gate that
ends "logged in forever" — refresh now rejects tokens whose original
login (auth_time) is older than abs_max seconds.
Algorithm (plan §4.5):
1. Decode JWT (dep already handles idle expiry).
2. Load user; reject inactive/missing as invalid_refresh_token.
3. Resolve effective auth_time/idle_max/abs_max, grandfathering
pre-PR tokens by snapshotting current account policy.
4. Atomically revoke the JTI regardless of outcome — this consumes
the token whether or not the absolute check passes, so an
absolute-expired token cannot be replayed forever.
5. If the atomic UPDATE matched zero rows -> invalid_refresh_token.
6. If now >= auth_time + abs_max -> commit the revoke explicitly
(so it survives the rollback hook in get_admin_db) and 401
session_expired_absolute.
7. Otherwise mint via _mint_with_claims, carrying claims forward.
Boundary check uses `>=`, not `>` — a deadline equal to now is
expired. _refresh_session_tokens (commit 3) replaced by two narrower
helpers: _resolve_refresh_claims (grandfather logic, no mint) and
_mint_with_claims (mint with explicit claims, no grandfather). Makes
the endpoint's algorithm read top-down without indirection.
Tests added in test_session_policy.py:
- #8: backdate auth_time by exactly abs_max -> session_expired_absolute
at the deadline boundary.
- #9: same token tried twice; first returns session_expired_absolute
AND consumes the row; second returns invalid_refresh_token.
- #12: legacy token without auth_time/idle_max/abs_max gets one
successful rotation; new JWT carries fresh policy snapshot from
the account (3d/14d defaults under Strict).
25/25 across test_session_policy + test_auth + test_oauth_callbacks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Third commit in the session-expiration-policy series. Every refresh token
issued from now on carries the policy snapshot in its JWT (in seconds,
for direct Unix math), and every login/OAuth response surfaces both
expiry windows as ISO timestamps. /auth/refresh carries the claims
forward unchanged — including auth_time, which never resets on rotation.
Does NOT yet enforce the absolute cap — that's commit 4, sequenced so
the gate can be reverted independently if pilots hit an edge case.
But the wire is fully populated, and a grandfather path is already in
_refresh_session_tokens for tokens issued before this PR.
Key changes:
- core/security.py: create_refresh_token signature changes to
(user_id, *, auth_time, idle_max_seconds, abs_max_seconds). Adds
resolve_session_policy(account) -> (idle_minutes, absolute_minutes)
applying defaults for NULL overrides.
- schemas/token.py + schemas/oauth.py: Token and OAuthCallbackResponse
gain idle_expires_at + absolute_expires_at (Optional[datetime],
Pydantic emits ISO 8601 UTC strings).
- endpoints/auth.py: new _mint_session_tokens(user, db) and
_refresh_session_tokens(payload, user, db) helpers. /auth/login,
/auth/login/json, and /auth/refresh now route through them. The
refresh endpoint's pre-existing "Refresh token has been revoked"
error normalized to the taxonomy detail "invalid_refresh_token".
- endpoints/oauth.py: both Google and Microsoft callbacks call
_mint_session_tokens; OAuthCallbackResponse carries the expiry
fields through.
- tests: two new cases in test_session_policy.py — login_json embeds
the claims with strict defaults (3d/14d -> 259200/1209600 sec) and
surfaces matching ISO expiry fields; refresh carries auth_time,
idle_max, abs_max forward unchanged across rotation.
35/35 across test_session_policy + test_auth + test_oauth_callbacks +
test_account_invite_lookup + test_account_management.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Second commit in the session-expiration-policy series. Lands the
error-detail taxonomy from §4.10 of the plan; no UI-visible change yet
because the frontend interceptor (commit 7) doesn't read the new detail
strings, but the wire is now ready for it.
Today every /auth/refresh failure returns 401 "Invalid refresh token"
regardless of cause, so the frontend has no way to distinguish "your
session ended for security" from "we don't recognize this token at
all." This commit introduces:
- decode_refresh_token_strict(): wraps jose.jwt.decode and raises a new
IdleTokenExpired exception (from ExpiredSignatureError) so callers
can branch on idle expiry. All other jose failures still propagate
as JWTError. The legacy decode_token() is preserved for access-token,
password-reset, and email-verification paths that don't need the
distinction.
- get_refresh_token_payload(): now maps IdleTokenExpired ->
"session_expired_idle", JWTError and wrong-type tokens ->
"invalid_refresh_token".
- test_session_policy.py: new test file (will accumulate cases across
the series). Three tests for the taxonomy: idle-expired returns
session_expired_idle; wrong type returns invalid_refresh_token; bad
signature returns invalid_refresh_token.
20/20 across test_session_policy + test_auth + test_oauth_callbacks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The kb_setup fixture asserts free-plan quota numbers (lifetime_conversions_limit=3),
but Phase 1 conftest seeds test_user on Pro. Downgrade explicitly inside kb_setup
to preserve the original test intent without affecting other suites.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mounts on Pro routers (trees, sessions, scripts, FlowPilot, etc.) and
returns 402 with structured detail when an account's subscription is
missing or locked. Allowlist bypasses billing/account/auth flows so
users can recover from a lapsed subscription.
Conftest now seeds a default Pro/active Subscription on test_user and
test_admin (delete-then-insert because the register endpoint already
creates a free/active sub by default). Two existing tests adapted to
the new seeded plan; tenant-isolation tests seed Subscription rows for
the accounts they create directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Engineer applies a fix but can't verify yet (waiting on client power-cycle,
AD replication, async sync). Today the verifying banner forces a synchronous
verdict (worked / didn't / partial) — anything else means leaving the banner
stale or guessing wrong. This adds a fourth outcome that parks the fix in a
non-terminal "Awaiting verification" state with a reason ("waiting on what?")
and exposes it on the chat-anchored banner so the engineer doesn't lose track.
Backend
- New non-terminal status `applied_pending` parallel to `applied_partial`.
- New `pending_reason` column (nullable Text) — the "what are you waiting on?"
prose, mirrors `partial_notes`. Required when outcome=applied_pending.
- Outcome endpoint allows pending in/out transitions; pending stamps
applied_at but NOT verified_at (it's parked, not verified).
- Resolution-note + escalation-package prompts handle the new status:
resolution note frames the fix as provisional; escalation package surfaces
pending verification as the leading hypothesis with reference to what's
being waited on.
- Migration: add column + extend status CHECK constraint.
Frontend
- New `BannerMode = 'pending'` + `PendingBanner` component (info-tone,
parallel to PartialBanner) with worked / didn't / update-reason actions.
- VerifyingBanner overflow menu adds "Waiting to verify…".
- Nudge banner's "Still checking" button now actually records pending with
a reason, instead of just silencing for the session.
- AssistantChatPage banner-mode derivation maps applied_pending → 'pending'.
Tests: 4 new integration tests covering pending notes requirement, reason
storage + applied_at/verified_at semantics, pending→success transition,
and pending_reason update on re-PATCH.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex review pass on the escalation wedge. Reworks claim_session from
read-then-write to a conditional UPDATE so two seniors racing can't both
win, blocks the original engineer from claiming their own handoff, and
filters self-escalated sessions out of the dashboard escalation queue.
Also preassigns the handoff UUID before flush so the compatibility
escalation_package payload carries it. Removes legacy frontend pickup
state (claiming, handleStartHere) that broke tsc --noEmit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four items from the design-plan audit, all flagged as locked-design or
Codex corrections, shipped together so the GTM demo path covers them
end-to-end before bug bash.
1. Live AI assessment refresh on the magic-moment screen. Backend already
publishes handoff_assessment_ready when enrich_escalation_async commits;
wire the frontend listener so the senior sees the assessment populate
without a manual reopen. New event type + onAssessmentReady handler on
streamEscalations; AssistantChatPage opens a scoped SSE subscription
whenever it tracks a handoff missing its assessment, refetches on match,
and replaces magicHandoff / overlayHandoff in place. Closes the loop on
the async-assessment commit e8ba74e.
2. Suggested-step chips below the chat input. Locked design from the plan
(Codex correction). Chip strip renders above the composer post-claim
when ai_assessment_data.suggested_steps[] is non-empty. Click prefills
the input and focuses; first send or explicit X hides for the session.
3. Unread 6px dot on EscalationQueue cards. localStorage-persisted seen
set (rf-escalation-seen, capped 200). Dot top-right when not seen.
Cleared on open (card click) or claim (Pick Up) — NOT on hover, per
Codex correction. Pick Up stops propagation so it doesn't double-fire.
4. Race-condition toast on claim conflict. The /claim endpoint previously
silently overwrote claimed_by — both seniors thought they owned the
session. New HandoffAlreadyClaimedError carries the winner's id/name/
timestamp; claim_session rejects different-user re-claims (same-user is
idempotent for double-click safety); endpoint returns 409 with
structured detail. AssistantChatPage.handleStartHere extracts and
surfaces "Already claimed by {name} {time_ago}." via toast, drops
?pickup=true, dismisses magic-moment so the loser flows back to queue.
Tests: 2 new unit tests in test_handoff_manager.py (conflict raises,
same-user idempotent). Full handoff + escalation suite (34 tests) green.
Frontend tsc -b clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First half of the WebSocket/SSE push slice. Paused mid-flight to hand
the branch to Codex for outside-voice review before stacking more
commits on top. See .ai/HANDOFF.md for the full pause context + what
to look at.
What's here:
- backend/app/core/escalation_bus.py — module-level singleton in-memory
pub/sub keyed by account_id. asyncio.Queue per subscriber with
64-event maxsize and drop-on-full semantics. Designed to be swappable
for Redis pub/sub when Railway scales past single-replica.
- backend/app/api/endpoints/session_handoffs.py — GET
/api/v1/ai-sessions/escalations/stream SSE endpoint. Auth via
require_engineer_or_admin. 25s heartbeat. Account-scoped subscribe
bound to current_user.account_id.
- backend/app/services/handoff_manager.py — dispatch_escalation_notifications
now publishes a `handoff_created` event to the bus BEFORE the email
fan-out, in a try/except so a bus failure can't block email delivery.
- backend/tests/test_escalation_bus.py — 7 unit tests, all green
standalone (0.14s). Cross-tenant isolation, drop-on-full, no-subscribers.
- backend/tests/test_handoff_manager.py — +1 dispatcher integration test
(publishes to bus, payload shape).
- backend/tests/test_session_handoffs_api.py — +2 endpoint tests (viewer
blocked, ready event handshake).
[gstack-context]
Decisions:
- SSE over WebSocket (one-way, browser EventSource semantics, fewer
moving parts behind Railway proxy)
- In-memory bus over Redis for v1 pilot (3 MSPs, single replica)
- Drop-on-full subscriber queue rather than back-pressure publishers
- Bus publish ahead of email send, both wrapped in try/except so
neither can break handoff creation
- Frontend will be a fetch-based ReadableStream reader matching the
existing streamDocumentation pattern, not native EventSource
(custom-header auth)
Remaining (post-Codex):
- Frontend SSE subscription in EscalationQueue.tsx (slide-in,
reconnect, tab-title flash, prefers-reduced-motion)
- Magic-moment handoff-context screen
- Re-run the full backend test suite to verify the SSE +
dispatcher integration tests (bus units already green standalone)
Tried:
- Running the full test suite repeatedly without xdist; the per-test
DROP SCHEMA + recreate fixture made wall-clock prohibitive when
multiple stale runs collided on the same Postgres test schema.
Resolution: -n auto next time.
[/gstack-context]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First half of the Escalation Mode notification dual-path. WebSocket/SSE
push is the second half (next commit) — email handles offline seniors,
push handles online ones for the magic-moment demo.
HandoffManager.dispatch_escalation_notifications:
- Pulls active engineer/admin/owner-role users in the same account_id
(excludes the escalator + viewers + soft-deleted)
- Sends via existing EmailService.send_notification_email, concurrent
via asyncio.gather; per-message failures don't block the rest
- Wrapped in try/except: any exception is logged + swallowed. Handoff
creation is authoritative; notification is advisory. This is the
graceful-degradation regression both eng + codex reviews flagged as
critical (handoff must succeed even if SMTP is down).
Endpoint wiring (POST /ai-sessions/{id}/handoff):
- Dispatch fires AFTER db.commit() — never email about a rolled-back
handoff. Trust-erosion bug if we got that wrong.
- Only fires for intent=escalate. Park is private to the escalator.
Tests (4 new):
- emails-engineer-recipients-in-account: viewer excluded, escalator
excluded, only the engineer/admin teammates get the message
- skipped-for-park-intent: park doesn't fan out
- graceful-degradation-when-email-raises: RuntimeError from the email
service does NOT bubble out of dispatch
- endpoint-dispatches-on-escalate: end-to-end wiring through POST
Per-channel delivery records (replacing the dead `notification_sent`
boolean per Codex correction) is a v1.x story — for now application
logs are the audit trail. See
docs/plans/2026-04-27-escalation-mode-wedge-design.md.
20 tests green across handoff_manager + session_handoffs_api +
flowpilot_analytics_escalations. No regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /ai-sessions/{id}/handoffs/{hid}/claim previously required only an
authenticated user, so a viewer-role account user could claim escalations.
Codex review flagged this as wedge-relevant: the Escalation Mode race-
condition story (two seniors clicking Pick Up simultaneously) depends on
auth gating for audit integrity. Originally captured as a deferred TODO
during /plan-eng-review, then moved in-scope by /codex review.
Swap the dep to require_engineer_or_admin. One-line change. Two new tests:
- viewer_role gets 403 with "Engineer or admin access required"
- engineer/owner role still succeeds and claimed_at + claimed_by populate
Existing handoff create + queue tests unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /api/v1/analytics/flowpilot/escalations?period={7d,30d,90d}
Computes the in-product wedge metric for Escalation Mode: average / median /
p95 seconds between SessionHandoff.claimed_at and the first ai_session_step
created on the same session after that timestamp. Account-scoped, role-gated
to engineer-or-admin.
The metric is intentionally NOT called "minutes recovered" — that's the
two-metric framing locked by /codex review: this in-product number must be
paired with manual baseline (the verbal-handoff stopwatch from The Assignment)
to produce the savings claim. Schema's `metric_definition` field surfaces the
disclaimer in every response so callers don't oversell it.
Implementation notes:
- Uses correlated scalar subquery for first-step-after-claim per handoff,
aggregates avg/median/p95 in Python (~1k rows/account/month is well within
budget; cleaner than percentile_cont gymnastics in SQL)
- Excludes unclaimed handoffs (claimed_at IS NULL)
- Counts claimed-but-no-action handoffs in n_handoffs_claimed but not in
n_handoffs_with_action — surfaces the conversion-rate signal
- Floors negative deltas at 0 to handle clock-drift edge cases
Tests cover happy path, zero-data, claimed-but-no-action accounting, period
window filtering, multi-handoff aggregation, multi-tenant isolation (Phase 4
RLS landmine pattern), viewer-role 403 gate, and period validation. 9 tests,
all green. No regressions in existing handoff_manager / session_handoffs
suites.
First piece of the Approach A wedge build per
docs/plans/2026-04-27-escalation-mode-wedge-design.md. Unblocks the queue
stat-card and the analytics page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend suite is the slow gate (1076 passed locally in 22m27s on
fix/ci-workflow-config). Adding pytest-xdist with per-worker DB
isolation drops it to ~4m20s on the 8-core homelab runner. Verified
locally: `pytest -n auto --no-cov` finished in 4m28s real time
(15m19s user — confirms ~5× parallelism).
How it works:
- conftest.py reads `PYTEST_XDIST_WORKER` (set per worker by xdist —
'gw0', 'gw1', …). When set, derives a per-worker DB URL like
`…/resolutionflow_test_gw0`. The base DB stays for serial / master
runs.
- `_ensure_worker_db_exists` runs synchronously at conftest import,
connects to the postgres maintenance DB, and `CREATE DATABASE`s the
worker-suffixed DB if it doesn't exist. Idempotent across runs.
- The "test" safety guard still applies — every worker DB name
contains "test" so the assertion holds.
- The per-test `DROP SCHEMA public CASCADE` now operates on the
worker's isolated DB, no cross-worker race.
CI workflow: backend job switches to `pytest -n auto`. Coverage still
collected (pytest-cov has built-in xdist support).
Adds `pytest-xdist==3.6.1` to requirements-dev.txt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three changes that get PR #150 to a green CI gate:
1. **test_record_decision_persists_and_bumps_state_version** — the
`decision: draft_template` path calls `_extract_template_parameters`
(TemplateExtractionService → AI provider). CI doesn't set
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY/GOOGLE_AI_API_KEY, so the endpoint raised
`RuntimeError: No AI provider configured` and returned 500. The test
isn't exercising the AI integration — patched the extractor with an
AsyncMock returning a minimal valid `{templated_body, parameters}`
dict. Verified locally: the test now passes.
2. **pip + npm caches** in backend, frontend, and e2e jobs. Keyed on
the hash of requirements*.txt / package-lock.json with a runner-os
restore-key fallback. Saves ~30-60s per run on cache hit.
3. **Pytest invocation tightened**:
- Dropped `--cov-report=term-missing` — the custom "Display coverage
summary" step below parses coverage.json and prints the same
module list more concisely. Term-missing dumps every uncovered
line which adds ~5-10s of stdout.
- Added `--maxfail=10` so a structural breakage (fixture explosion,
DB unreachable) bails after 10 errors instead of running the full
25-min suite. Tunable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The test_db fixture calls Base.metadata.create_all on a fresh test DB.
That only creates tables for models that have been imported (and thus
registered with Base.metadata) by the time the fixture runs.
app.main imports app.core.database (which gives us Base) but does NOT
eagerly import the model modules — most are pulled in lazily inside
scheduler functions (archive_stale_ai_sessions etc.) and route
modules. At fixture-setup time, only the handful of models touched by
those eager imports are on the metadata, so any test that exercises
PSA, network diagrams, ratings, escalations, etc. fails with
\`UndefinedTableError: relation "X" does not exist\` and a cascade of
500s on every endpoint that queries the missing table.
Adding \`from app import models as _models\` (rather than the bare
\`import app.models\` which would shadow the \`app\` FastAPI instance
imported just above) pulls in app/models/__init__.py, which itself
imports every model module — registering all ~60 tables with
Base.metadata before create_all runs.
Verified locally: tests/test_psa_writeback_phase4.py went from
1 failed / 6 errors → 4 failed / 3 passed (the cascading errors were
masking the actual passes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in PR #141 (PSA ticket management) so FlowPilot can ship on top
of a unified main. Two manual conflict resolutions:
1. CLAUDE.md — kept the FlowPilot ai-handoff rewrite (`.ai/`-driven
protocol). The pre-rewrite reference content (CW integration notes,
lessons archive, env vars table) lives in `docs/connectwise/`,
`docs/LESSONS-ARCHIVE.md`, and DEV-ENV.md by design.
2. frontend/src/pages/AssistantChatPage.tsx — both conflict regions
were purely additive. Concatenated FlowPilot's Phase 2-9 state hooks
(facts, activeFix, preview*, scriptPanelOpen, templatizeQueue) with
PSA's spin-off ticket state (linkedTicket, showNewTicket, spinOffHint).
Both modal mounts (TemplatizePrompt, ShortcutsHelpOverlay,
NewTicketModal) kept. All setters wired by either branch are intact.
Verification:
- `tsc -b` clean across the merged tree.
- Browser smoke-test (Session B fixture): Phase 9 ProposalBanner
("Run AI-drafted PowerShell to recover SSL VPN") renders alongside
PSA's new Tickets sidebar icon. Console clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
