feat(auth): embed auth_time/idle_max/abs_max in refresh tokens at every login

Third commit in the session-expiration-policy series. Every refresh token
issued from now on carries the policy snapshot in its JWT (in seconds,
for direct Unix math), and every login/OAuth response surfaces both
expiry windows as ISO timestamps. /auth/refresh carries the claims
forward unchanged — including auth_time, which never resets on rotation.

Does NOT yet enforce the absolute cap — that's commit 4, sequenced so
the gate can be reverted independently if pilots hit an edge case.
But the wire is fully populated, and a grandfather path is already in
_refresh_session_tokens for tokens issued before this PR.

Key changes:
- core/security.py: create_refresh_token signature changes to
  (user_id, *, auth_time, idle_max_seconds, abs_max_seconds). Adds
  resolve_session_policy(account) -> (idle_minutes, absolute_minutes)
  applying defaults for NULL overrides.
- schemas/token.py + schemas/oauth.py: Token and OAuthCallbackResponse
  gain idle_expires_at + absolute_expires_at (Optional[datetime],
  Pydantic emits ISO 8601 UTC strings).
- endpoints/auth.py: new _mint_session_tokens(user, db) and
  _refresh_session_tokens(payload, user, db) helpers. /auth/login,
  /auth/login/json, and /auth/refresh now route through them. The
  refresh endpoint's pre-existing "Refresh token has been revoked"
  error normalized to the taxonomy detail "invalid_refresh_token".
- endpoints/oauth.py: both Google and Microsoft callbacks call
  _mint_session_tokens; OAuthCallbackResponse carries the expiry
  fields through.
- tests: two new cases in test_session_policy.py — login_json embeds
  the claims with strict defaults (3d/14d -> 259200/1209600 sec) and
  surfaces matching ISO expiry fields; refresh carries auth_time,
  idle_max, abs_max forward unchanged across rotation.

35/35 across test_session_policy + test_auth + test_oauth_callbacks +
test_account_invite_lookup + test_account_management.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-13 16:22:53 -04:00
parent 2375948b7a
commit d6a02ee8da
6 changed files with 255 additions and 66 deletions

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ from app.core.security import (
create_email_verification_token,
decode_token,
hash_token,
resolve_session_policy,
)
from app.models.user import User
from app.models.invite_code import InviteCode
@@ -67,6 +68,97 @@ async def store_refresh_token(db: AsyncSession, refresh_token_str: str, user_id)
db.add(token_record)
async def _mint_session_tokens(user: User, db: AsyncSession) -> Token:
"""Mint a fresh refresh+access pair for a new login.
Snapshots the account's current session policy into the refresh JWT
(auth_time/idle_max/abs_max) and registers the JTI in refresh_tokens.
Caller is responsible for committing the session. Use this for every
NEW login (password, OAuth, etc.) — for /auth/refresh use
_refresh_session_tokens instead, which carries claims forward.
See docs/plans/2026-05-13-session-expiration-policy.md §4.6.
"""
account = (
await db.execute(select(Account).where(Account.id == user.account_id))
).scalar_one()
idle_minutes, abs_minutes = resolve_session_policy(account)
idle_max_seconds = idle_minutes * 60
abs_max_seconds = abs_minutes * 60
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
auth_time_unix = int(now.timestamp())
refresh_token_str = create_refresh_token(
user_id=str(user.id),
auth_time=auth_time_unix,
idle_max_seconds=idle_max_seconds,
abs_max_seconds=abs_max_seconds,
)
access_token = create_access_token(data={"sub": str(user.id)})
await store_refresh_token(db, refresh_token_str, user.id)
return Token(
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=refresh_token_str,
token_type="bearer",
must_change_password=user.must_change_password,
idle_expires_at=now + timedelta(seconds=idle_max_seconds),
absolute_expires_at=datetime.fromtimestamp(
auth_time_unix + abs_max_seconds, tz=timezone.utc
),
)
async def _refresh_session_tokens(
payload: dict, user: User, db: AsyncSession
) -> Token:
"""Carry session-policy claims forward across a refresh-token rotation.
Grandfathers legacy tokens issued before this PR (no auth_time claim)
by snapshotting the account's current policy and treating now() as
auth_time — i.e. one free rotation under the new policy. Caller
commits.
Does NOT enforce the absolute cap — that lands in the next commit so
the cap can be rolled back independently if needed.
"""
auth_time = payload.get("auth_time")
idle_max_seconds = payload.get("idle_max")
abs_max_seconds = payload.get("abs_max")
if auth_time is None or idle_max_seconds is None or abs_max_seconds is None:
# Grandfather path — legacy token from before the session-policy PR.
account = (
await db.execute(select(Account).where(Account.id == user.account_id))
).scalar_one()
idle_minutes, abs_minutes = resolve_session_policy(account)
auth_time = int(datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp())
idle_max_seconds = idle_minutes * 60
abs_max_seconds = abs_minutes * 60
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
refresh_token_str = create_refresh_token(
user_id=str(user.id),
auth_time=auth_time,
idle_max_seconds=idle_max_seconds,
abs_max_seconds=abs_max_seconds,
)
access_token = create_access_token(data={"sub": str(user.id)})
await store_refresh_token(db, refresh_token_str, user.id)
return Token(
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=refresh_token_str,
token_type="bearer",
must_change_password=user.must_change_password,
idle_expires_at=now + timedelta(seconds=idle_max_seconds),
absolute_expires_at=datetime.fromtimestamp(
auth_time + abs_max_seconds, tz=timezone.utc
),
)
def _generate_display_code() -> str:
"""Generate a random 8-character alphanumeric display code."""
chars = string.ascii_uppercase + string.digits
@@ -323,20 +415,9 @@ async def login(
# Update last login
user.last_login = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
# Create tokens
access_token = create_access_token(data={"sub": str(user.id)})
refresh_token_str = create_refresh_token(data={"sub": str(user.id)})
# Store refresh token hash in DB
await store_refresh_token(db, refresh_token_str, user.id)
token = await _mint_session_tokens(user, db)
await db.commit()
return Token(
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=refresh_token_str,
token_type="bearer",
must_change_password=user.must_change_password,
)
return token
@router.post("/login/json", response_model=Token)
@@ -359,19 +440,9 @@ async def login_json(
user.last_login = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
access_token = create_access_token(data={"sub": str(user.id)})
refresh_token_str = create_refresh_token(data={"sub": str(user.id)})
# Store refresh token hash in DB
await store_refresh_token(db, refresh_token_str, user.id)
token = await _mint_session_tokens(user, db)
await db.commit()
return Token(
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=refresh_token_str,
token_type="bearer",
must_change_password=user.must_change_password,
)
return token
@router.post("/refresh", response_model=Token)
@@ -402,10 +473,12 @@ async def refresh_token(
revoked_row = result.fetchone()
if not revoked_row:
# Either the token doesn't exist or was already revoked/used
# Either the token doesn't exist or was already revoked/used.
# Surfaced to the frontend as a plain logout — not "session
# expired" — because the user did not hit a policy boundary.
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Refresh token has been revoked"
detail="invalid_refresh_token"
)
result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
@@ -414,21 +487,12 @@ async def refresh_token(
if not user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="User not found"
detail="invalid_refresh_token"
)
access_token = create_access_token(data={"sub": str(user.id)})
new_refresh_token_str = create_refresh_token(data={"sub": str(user.id)})
# Store new refresh token
await store_refresh_token(db, new_refresh_token_str, user.id)
token = await _refresh_session_tokens(payload, user, db)
await db.commit()
return Token(
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=new_refresh_token_str,
token_type="bearer"
)
return token
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserResponse)