fix: high-severity security hardening (Phase B permissions audit)
Phase B addresses 7 high-severity gaps from the permissions audit: - B1: Enforce tree access check on session start via can_access_tree - B2: Replace all inline permission helpers with centralized permissions.py - B3: Fix require_engineer_or_admin to check is_team_admin before role - B4: Add is_active field on User with enforcement in get_current_active_user - B5: Add admin user management endpoints (list, get, role, team-admin, deactivate, activate) - B6: Add rate limiting on auth/invite endpoints via slowapi (disabled in DEBUG) - B7: Implement refresh token rotation with JTI-based revocation and meaningful logout Also reduces access token TTL from 15 to 5 minutes and updates CLAUDE.md with SaaS/MSP context for future planning sessions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -67,8 +67,11 @@ async def get_current_active_user(
|
||||
current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)]
|
||||
) -> User:
|
||||
"""Ensure user is active (not disabled)."""
|
||||
# For now, all users are considered active
|
||||
# Add logic here if you add an is_active field to User
|
||||
if not current_user.is_active:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
|
||||
detail="Account has been deactivated"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return current_user
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -90,6 +93,8 @@ async def require_engineer_or_admin(
|
||||
"""Require engineer, team admin, or super admin role (blocks viewers)."""
|
||||
if current_user.is_super_admin:
|
||||
return current_user
|
||||
if current_user.is_team_admin and current_user.team_id is not None:
|
||||
return current_user
|
||||
if current_user.role not in ("engineer",):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user